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LABOR INJUNCTIONS PENDING ARBITRATION: SHOULD





As drug abuse has become more prevalent among the general popula-
tion,' many employers have responded by seeking to curtail employee
drug use through the implementation of mandatory drug-testing pro-
grams.2 Normally, non-unionized employees must comply with these
programs or seek work elsewhere. Labor unions, however, can negotiate
collective bargaining agreements that offer some unionized employees ad-
ditional rights and responsibilities with respect to employer-initiated
drug-testing programs. A standard clause in such agreements provides
that either side may demand arbitration to settle disputes over interpreta-
tion of any provision of the agreement.3
When management decides to implement a new drug-testing program
or strengthen an existing one, it may be reluctant to walt for the current
collective bargaining agreement to expire before doing so.4 Conversely,
unions often feel that a new or modified drug-testing program should be
subject to collective bargaining negotiation, or that such a serious em-
ployment alteration should not be allowed until management's rights are
determined by an arbitrator.' Collective bargaining agreements gener-
ally contain arbitration clauses that are broad enough to cover the ques-
tion of whether management has the unilateral power under the
agreement to unilaterally implement a new drug-testing program or to
strengthen an existing one.6
When a union objects to management's newly proposed drug-testing
program, it will usually submit its grievance to an arbitrator; in the
meantime, the union may also seek to enjoin the implementation of the
program pending the arbitrator's decision.7 This Note addresses whether
management has a right to unilaterally implement its own drug-testing
program before an arbitrator has rendered a final decision.
Part I of this Note examines the history of labor injunctions pending
1. See Note, The Drug War in the Workplace: Employee Drug Testing under Collec-
tive Bargaining Agreements, 5 St. John's J. Legal Commentary 1, 1 & n.1 (1989).
2. See id. at 2.
3. See id at 19-20.
4. Management may feel that the agreement allows it to institute such a change
under the collective bargaining agreement's express drug-testing provision, under the
"management rights clause,] or [under] an implied agreement between the parties." Id.
at 20.
5. See id, at 18 n.76.
6. See id. at 19-20.
7. See id at 18 n.76.
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arbitration and demonstrates that the law controlling suits by manage-
ment to enjoin union activity is equally applicable to cases in which the
union seeks the injunction. Part II of the Note discusses the two tests
used to determine whether to grant drug-testing injunctions and explains
how the federal courts have applied these tests in specific factual con-
texts. Part III then analyzes the arguments both for and against injunc-
tions staying drug-testing programs pending arbitration of the dispute.
Finally, this Note concludes that courts should grant these injunctions
because the employee privacy interests implicated in drug testing are ir-
reparably injured if management unilaterally implements a drug-testing
program pending arbitration.
I. BACKGROUND
In examining whether a union may obtain an injunction against man-
agement's drug-testing activities, courts are faced with a conflict between
two federal statutes: the Norris-LaGuardia Act8 and the Labor Manage-
ment Relations [Taft-Hartley] Act.9 The Norris-LaGuardia Act broadly
prohibits federal courts from issuing injunctions in labor disputes.' 0 Sec-
tion 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act, however, gives federal district courts
the power to enforce "contracts between an employer and a labor organi-
zation representing employees in an industry affecting commerce.""
The Supreme Court addressed this statutory tension three times dur-
ing the 1970s in cases where management sought to enjoin a union's vio-
lation of a no-strike clause.' 2 The Court held generally that "[t]he literal
[anti-injunction] terms of the Norris-LaGuardia Act must be accommo-
dated to the subsequently enacted [contract-enforcement] provisions of
Section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations [Taft-Hartley] Act
and the purposes of arbitration."' 3
The Court first resolved the conflict in Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail
Clerks Union '" by carving out an exception to the Norris-LaGuardia
Act. This exception was available, the Court held, if the collective bar-
gaining agreement contained an express or implied undertaking not to
8. Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1988).
9. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act §§ 1-503, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-88
(1988). For cases that discuss the conflict between the Acts, see Buffalo Forge Co. v.
United Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397, 406 (1976); Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Work-
ers, 414 U.S. 368, 380-81 (1974); Boys Mkts., Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U.S. 235,
249-50 (1970).
10. See Norris LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1988). "No court of the United
States... shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or temporary or perma-
nent injunction in a case involving or growing out of a labor dispute." Id.
11. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a)
(1988).
12. See Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397 (1976); Gateway Coal
Co. v. United Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368 (1974); Boys Mkts., Inc. v. Retail Clerks
Union, 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
13. Boys Markets, 398 U.S. at 250.
14. 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
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strike, if the strike was over an arbitrable dispute, and if "ordinary prin-
ciples of equity" supported the issuance of the injunction."s The equita-
ble principles identified were (1) whether breaches of the no-strike clause
were occurring or being threatened; (2) whether the employer would be
irreparably injured; and (3) whether the employer would suffer more
from the denial of the injunction than the union would from its issu-
ance.16 Notably missing from this standard, however, was any likeli-
hood-of-success-on-the-merits analysis commonly utilized in rulings on
requests for injunctions. Presumably, the Boys Markets standard avoids
this analysis because it would usurp the role of the arbitrator, who has
exclusive authority to render judgments on the merits in an arbitrated
dispute. Since the parties to a collectively bargained arbitration clause
have agreed that an arbitrator from their industry should decide the sub-
stantive issue at stake, the Court's injunction analysis, as formulated in
Boys Markets, focuses only on the interim period before the arbitrator's
decision. The Court has had a long history of respect for arbitrators'
expertise, based on the superior knowledge arbitrators possess of all the
nuances in their particular industry."7
In Boys Markets, the Court enjoined the Retail Clerks Union from
violating its no-strike clause during a dispute concerning whether non-
union members could perform certain jobs." While acknowledging that
its holding seemed to defy the anti-injunction mandate of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act, the Court noted that "[t]he Norris-LaGuardia Act was
15. Id. at 254 (quoting Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 228 (1962)
(Brennan, J., dissenting)).
16. See id. The first prong of this test, whether breaches of the no-strike clause are
occurring or being threatened, is inapplicable to drug-testing cases, which involve only
the single dispute over the implementation of the drug-testing program. By contrast, a
strike is symptomatic of yet another union-management dispute. Cases such as Boys
Markets involve two disputes: one over the no-strike clause and the other over the sub-
ject of the threatened strike. The second two prongs-irreparable injury and balance of
hardships-should be used to show frustration of the arbitral process, and thus justify
enjoining management in drug-testing cases. See infra notes 121-49 and accompanying
text.
17. See Nolde Bros., Inc. v. Local 358, Bakery Workers Union, 430 U.S. 243, 253
(1977); Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368, 378-79 (1974); United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83 (1960).
In the recent case of Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int'l Union, Local 2-286 v. Amoco
Oil Co., 885 F.2d 697 (10th Cir. 1989), the Tenth Circuit found that inquiry into the
likelihood of success on the merits would undermine the arbitrator's role, a result prohib-
ited by Boys Markets and Buffalo Forge. See Oil, Chemical, 885 F.2d at 703. Instead, the
court only required the union to show "that the position... [it] will espouse in arbitra-
tion is sufficiently sound to prevent the arbitration from being a futile endeavor." Id. at
704 (quoting Amalgamated Transit Union, Div. 1384 v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 529 F.2d
1073, 1077-78 (9th Cir. 1976) [hereinafter Greyhound 1]); accord Aluminum Workers
Int'l Union, Local Union No. 215 v. Consolidated Aluminum Corp., 696 F.2d 437, 442
n.2 (6th Cir. 1982) (minimal inquiry into the likelihood of success on the merits); Local
Lodge No. 1266, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Panoramic Corp.,
668 F.2d 276, 284-85 (7th Cir. 1981) (same); Lever Bros. Co. v. International Chem.
Workers Union, Local 217, 554 F.2d 115, 120 (4th Cir. 1976) (same).
18. See Boys Mkts., Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U.S. 235, 253 (1970).
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responsive to a situation totally different from that which exists to-
day .... [T]he federal courts generally were regarded [at the time of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act's passage] as allies of management in its attempt
to prevent the organization and strengthening of labor unions."' 9 As la-
bor unions grew in strength, however, Congress became more interested
in encouraging collective bargaining and promoting peaceful resolution
of industrial disputes through arbitration.2° Congress's shift in emphasis,
however, as the Boys Markets Court pointed out, is seen only in its more
recent enactments, while older provisions including the anti-injunction
section of the Norris-LaGuardia Act remain intact.2 ' The Boys Markets
Court thus noted that failure to enjoin the union's strike would flout this
current congressional policy by discouraging employers from entering
into arbitration agreements.22 Thus, after Boys Markets, injunctions
were available in the labor-management context, but were limited to
management enforcement of a no-strike clause only if management satis-
fied the specific requirements.23
In its next decision involving an injunction sought in a labor dispute,
the Supreme Court again found a Boys Markets exception to the anti-
injunction rule, but in affirming the grant of management's request to
enjoin a union's strike the Court required management to maintain the
status quo pending arbitration.24 In Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine
Workers,25 the respondent union went on strike to protest the reinstate-
ment of two foremen who were facing criminal charges for certain on-site
safety violations. 26 The union refused to arbitrate so Gateway sought to
enjoin the strike and compel arbitration.27 The Court essentially fol-
lowed its Boys Markets analysis and found the dispute arbitrable under
the broad arbitration clause, from which a no-strike obligation could be
implied.28 It also found that traditional equitable principles supported
19. Id. at 250; see also Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 102 (1988) ("Whereas
under prevailing economic conditions ... the individual unorganized worker is com-
monly helpless to exercise actual liberty of contract and to protect his freedom of labor
... it is necessary that he have full freedom of association, self-organization, and designa-
tion of representatives of his own choosing.").
20. See Boys Markets, 398 U.S. at 251; see also Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steel-
workers, 428 U.S. 397, 432 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[like the decision in Boys
Markets, this opinion reflects ... my confidence that experience during the decades since
the Norris-LaGuardia Act was passed has dissipated any legitimate concern about the
impartiality of federal judges in disputes between labor and management").
21. See Boys Markets, 398 U.S. at 251.
22. See id. at 248; see also supra note I 1 and accompanying text (Labor Management
Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act gave courts jurisdiction over labor disputes without men-
tioning the Norris-LaGuardia Act).
23. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
24. See Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368, 387 (1974).
25. 414 U.S. 368 (1974).
26. See id. at 372.
27. See id.
28. See id. at 374.
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granting the injunction.29 The broad presumption of arbitrability osten-
sibly supported by the Court, and a major factor in its decision, 3° is irrel-
evant to typical drug-testing cases, where arbitrability is rarely
doubted.31 Gateway Coal remains particularly applicable to drug-testing
cases, however, because the injunction upheld by the Court merely
forced management to maintain the status quo pending arbitration.32
Furthermore, the case did not limit the availability of status quo injunc-
tions to situations where management seeks to enjoin a union's strike.
In its most recent decision in the area, the Supreme Court refused to
grant management's request to enjoin a union's strike, where such an
injunction would have usurped to role of the arbitrator assigned to decide
the pending dispute.33 In Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers,'4 the
respondent union held a sympathy strike to show support for a sister
union's battle with the petitioner, Buffalo Forge.35 The Court clarified
the Boys Markets exception and again stressed the importance of protect-
ing the arbitration process.3 6 The injunction sought by management was
denied for two reasons that support the commitment to arbitration.
First, the Court found that the no-strike clause did not clearly bar the
sympathy strike at issue, and thus the granting of the injunction would
usurp some of the arbitrator's power.3 7 Second, the underlying dispute,
which involved a sister union's disagreement with the common employer,
was not arbitrable, and therefore not worthy of injunctive protection. 3
The Buffalo Forge dissent, however, argued that focusing on the non-
arbitrability of the underlying dispute clouded the issue and deprived
management of its bargained-for no-strike clause, given in exchange for
the agreement to arbitrate disputes.39 The dissent stressed that enforcing
no-strike clauses only when the underlying dispute is arbitrable will
"frustrate the more basic policy of motivating employers to agree to
binding arbitration by giving them an effective 'assurance of uninter-
rupted operation during the term of the agreement.' "I
The Buffalo Forge Court, in dicta, also distinguished Boys Markets on
another ground. It noted that in Boys Markets, "it was also clear that the
29. See id.
30. See Cantor, Buffalo Forge and Injunctions Against Employer Breaches of Collec-
tive Bargaining Agreements, 1980 Wis. L. Rev. 247, 258 n.56.
31. Where drug testing is involved, the scope of management's unilateral rights is
usually a question of contractual analysis clearly subject to the standard arbitration
clause, thus obviating the need for any presumption. See Note, supra note 1, at 19-20.
32. See Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368, 387 (1974).
33. See Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397, 409-10 (1976).
34. 428 U.S. 397 (1976).
35. See id. at 401.
36. See id. at 412.
37. See id. at 409-10.
38. See id. at 409. Because of these findings, the Court did not reach the equitable
considerations of irreparable harm and balance of hardships. See id.
39. See id. at 423-24 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
40. Id. at 424 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Textile Workers Union of Am. v.
Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 454 (1957)).
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strike violated the no-strike clause accompanying the arbitration provi-
sions."' 41 Yet the finding of no clear violation of the no-strike clause in
Buffalo Forge seems to contradict the policy of leaving such decisions to
the arbitrator. 2 As noted above, disputes over drug-testing programs
are usually arbitrable.43
Whereas Boys Markets, Gateway Coal, and Buffalo Forge all involved
management requests to enjoin unions' strike activity pending arbitra-
tion, the Supreme Court has never considered a case where a labor union
sought to enjoin management's actions pending arbitration." Courts are
in general agreement, however, that the Boys Markets exception also ap-
plies to litigation maintained by unions.4 The Supreme Court endorsed
such an application when it vacated and remanded the decision in Amal-
gamated Transit Union, Div. 1384 v. Greyhound Lines, Inc. ("Greyhound
11,),46 which granted an injunction against Greyhound, so that the Ninth
Circuit could re-consider its initial decision in light of Buffalo Forge.4 7
In Greyhound 1, the Ninth Circuit had affirmed an injunction pending
arbitration against a bus company attempting to alter its work cycles.48
On remand, however, the court, in light of Buffalo Forge's renewed pro-
motion of the arbitration process, formulated the "Status Quo" stan-
dard49 and reversed, finding that the injunction was improperly
granted.50 The Supreme Court subsequently denied certiorari.-1 The
lower courts agree that unions seeking injunctive relief must satisfy the
41. Id. at 406 (emphasis added).
42. See id. It must be remembered, however, that drug testing is normally the sole
dispute requiring resolution, unlike a strike, which is merely a union's protest over the
underlying dispute. Even if courts should make some merits determination before issuing
a Boys Markets injunction, as some commentators have urged, (see Cantor, supra note 28,
at 290) this does not change this Note's argument that drug testing pending arbitration
causes irreparable harm and should be enjoined.
43. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
44. See, e.g., Utility Workers, Local No. 246 v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 852 F.2d
1083 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1078 (1989) (certiorari denied); Amalgamated
Transit Union, Div. 1384 v. Greyhound Lines, 550 F.2d 1237 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 837 (1977) (same) [hereinafter Greyhound II]. Presumably, in most cases, the arbi-
trator's decision discourages further appeal.
45. See Local Union No. 733 of the Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Ingalls Shipbuild-
ing Div., Litton Sys., 906 F.2d 149, 152 (5th Cir. 1990); Aluminum Workers Int'l Union,
Local Union No. 215 v. Consolidated Aluminum Corp., 696 F.2d 437, 441 (6th Cir.
1982); Local Lodge No. 1266, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Pano-
ramic Corp., 668 F.2d 276, 280 (7th Cir. 1981).
46. 529 F.2d 1073 (9th Cir. 1976) [Greyhound ].
47. See Greyhound Lines v. Amalgamated Transit Union, Div. 1384, 429 U.S. 807
(1976).
48. See id. at 1075.
49. See infra notes 55-66 and accompanying text for a discussion of the "Status Quo"
standard.
50. See Greyhound I, 550 F.2d 1237, 1239 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 837
(1977).
51. See Amalgamated Transit Union, Div. 1384 v. Greyhound Lines, 434 U.S. 837
(1977).
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same standards that the Court established for management.5 2 Moreover,
although there are different policy considerations involved in union-initi-
ated litigation, such as legitimate employer self-help methods, the goal of
promoting the arbitration process is still the primary one to be fulfilled in
examining drug-testing suits by unions against their employers. 3
II. STANDARDS EMPLOYED IN EVALUATING WHETHER A UNION IS
ENTITLED To AN INJUNCTION PENDING ARBITRATION
Although the courts agree that the Boys Markets exception to the Nor-
ris-LaGuardia Act applies when unions seek an injunction pending arbi-
tration, they have disagreed on what standard to use in determining
whether to grant such an injunction. Upon further analysis, however,
this disagreement becomes rather semantic, as both standards turn on the
ultimate question of irreparable injury.'
A. The "Status Quo" Standard
Under the first standard, the "Status Quo" standard, the employer
must have made an express or implied-in-fact promise to maintain the
status quo pending arbitration in order for the union to obtain an injunc-
tion.5 5 This approach was pioneered by the Ninth Circuit in Amalga-
mated Transit Union, Div. 1384 v. Greyhound Lines, Inc. ("Greyhound
ii,),6 after the Supreme Court vacated and remanded the injunction
granted in Greyhound I" in light of the Court's decision in Buffalo
Forge. The union in Greyhound II was seeking to enjoin the bus com-
pany's proposed work-schedule changes, and the Ninth Circuit had origi-
nally affirmed the District Court's grant of the injunction. 8 On remand,
the court found no express status quo promise, and held also that
"[w]hile a promise to submit a dispute to arbitration may justify a finding
of an implied duty not to strike .... such a promise does not imply a duty
on the part of the employer to preserve the status quo pending arbitra-
tion."'5 9 Thus, Greyhound was free to unilaterally change its employees'
work schedules pending arbitration-although interestingly, the arbitra-
tor had, in the meantime, already ruled in the company's favor."
52. See infra notes 54-91 and accompanying text discussing standards courts have
formulated in this area based on their interpretations of Boys Markets, Gateway Coal, and
Buffalo Forge.
53. See Niagara Hooker Employees Union v. Occidental Chem. Corp., 935 F.2d
1370, 1377 (2d Cir. 1991).
54. See infra, note 91 and accompanying text.
55. See Greyhound II, 550 F.2d 1237 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 837 (1977);
Texaco Indep. Union of the Coraopolis Terminal v. Texaco, Inc., 452 F.Supp. 1097
(W.D.Pa. 1978).
56. 550 F.2d 1237 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 837 (1977).
57. 529 F.2d 1073 (9th Cir. 1976).
58. See Greyhound II, 550 F.2d at 1238.
59. Id at 1238 (citing Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of Am., 414 U.S.
368 (1974)).
60. See id, at 1238.
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The "Status Quo" approach developed in Greyhound II was recently
employed again in Utility Workers, Local No. 246 v. Southern California
Edison Co.,61 where the Ninth Circuit ruled that a stay of implementa-
tion of a drug-testing program pending arbitration should be dissolved.62
The court in Texaco Independent Union v. Texaco, Inc.63 also used this
approach, and, finding no implied promise to maintain the status quo,
declined to grant the union's request to enjoin the oil company from uni-
laterally changing work schedules, wages, hours and conditions." The
court found that "[j]ust as the Supreme Court [in Buffalo Forge] could
find no basis for inferring an obligation not to engage in sympathy strikes
from the union's agreement to submit disputes between the company and
the union to arbitration, so this Court cannot infer from an agreement to
arbitrate disputes that the Company necessarily undertook to preserve
the status quo ante pending arbitration."65
Despite their holdings, Greyhound II, Utility Workers, and Texaco
carry little precedential value for the "Status Quo" approach. The Ninth
Circuit is the only appellate court that has applied this standard, and
Texaco is a district court opinion that has not been followed since 1978.
Moreover, as will be shown more fully below, this test collapses into a
tacit application of the "Hollow Formality" approach.66
B. The "Hollow Formality" Standard
The second approach, the "Hollow Formality" standard, focuses on
the overall policy and rule of Boys Markets and its progeny-namely, to
preserve the integrity of the arbitration process. 67 This standard was es-
tablished in Lever Bros. Co. v. International Chemical Workers Union,
Local 217,68 which involved a union that sought to enjoin a chemical
company from relocating its plant pending arbitration over what con-
tractual procedures the employer had to follow before relocating. Ini-
tially, the District Court granted the injunction and the Fourth Circuit
affirmed, relying on the Ninth Circuit's holding in Greyhound L69 On
rehearing, the court reaffirmed its decision in light of Buffalo Forge and
Greyhound II, and then established the "Hollow Formality" standard. 0
This standard allows a court to grant the injunction if failure to do so
would render "the arbitral process a hollow formality in those instances
where, as here, the arbitral award when rendered could not return the
61. 852 F.2d 1083 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1078 (1989).
62. See id., 852 F.2d at 1088.
63. 452 F. Supp. 1097 (W.D.Pa. 1978).
64. See id. at 1108.
65. Id. at 1104.
66. See infra notes 79-91 and accompanying text.
67. See Lever Bros. Co. v. International Chem. Workers Union, Local 217, 554 F.2d
115, 123 (4th Cir. 1976).
68. 554 F.2d 115 (4th Cir. 1976).
69. See id. at 119-20; supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
70. See Lever Bros., 554 F.2d at 121-23.
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parties substantially to the status quo ante.""1 Most other circuits have
adopted the Lever Brothers "Hollow Formality" approach.72
The facts of Lever Brothers were somewhat unusual since the collective
bargaining agreement did not give the arbitrator the power to prevent
management from relocating its plant.73 The arbitrator could, however,
order management to follow the procedures outlined in the agreement
that would give the union an opportunity to dissuade management from
relocating.74 The court noted that had the injunction not been given, the
union would "have had a double burden to satisfy-first, to convince the
company that it should not have moved the plant... afait accompli, and
then it would have had the burden to convince the company to move the
plant back."'75 Therefore, the court said, "had there not been an injunc-
tion pending arbitration to preserve the status quo, the [union] employees
. . . would have been totally and permanently deprived of their
employment."
76
The Lever Brothers court further noted that Buffalo Forge supported
the "Hollow Formality" standard with its policy of "judicial non-inter-
ference in the arbitral process," since the injunction would only be given
if the arbitral process was threatened by management's proposed
changes.77 The Fourth Circuit stated that "'the interpretation and ap-
plication of contractual provisions remain the exclusive province of the
arbitrator,' and further that '[c]ourts will intervene only when necessary
to protect the arbitral jurisdiction and then only in a manner that avoids
examination of the merits, and thus respects the process of which it seeks
to protect.' "78
71. Id. at 123.
72. See, eg., Niagara Hooker Employees Union v. Occidental Chem. Corp., 935 F.2d
1370 (2d Cir. 1991) (standard for determining whether injunction should be issued is
whether the employer's actions would render the arbitration process a hollow formality);
Local Union No. 733 of the Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Ingalls Shipbuilding Div.,
Litton Sys., 906 F.2d 149 (5th Cir. 1990) (same); Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int'l
Union, Local 2-286 v. Amoco Oil Co., 885 F.2d 697 (10th Cir. 1989) (same); Independ-
ent Oil & Chem. Workers v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 864 F.2d 927 (1st Cir. 1988)
(same); Nursing Home & Hosp. Union No. 434 v. Sky Vue Terrace, Inc., 759 F.2d 1094
(3d Cir. 1985) (same); Aluminum Workers Int'l Union, Local Union No. 215 v. Consoli-
dated Aluminum Corp., 696 F.2d 437 (6th Cir. 1982) (same); Local Lodge No. 1266,
Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Panoramic Corp., 668 F.2d 276 (7th
Cir. 1981) (same).
73. See Lever Bros., 554 F.2d at 118.
74. See id.
75. Id. at 122. (emphasis in original).
76. Id. (emphasis in original).
77. Id. at 123.
78. Id. (quoting Note, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 56, 251
(1976)). This standard also draws support from the Supreme Court's decision in Brother-
hood of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Missouri-Kan.-Tex. R.R., 363 U.S. 528 (1960). The Court
in that case found that the district judge's decison to grant the status quo injunction
"would operate to preserve that jurisdiction [of the arbitrator] by preventing injury so
irreparable that a decision of the [arbitrator] in the unions' favor would be but an empty
victory." Id. at 534.
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C. The Symmetry of the Standards
A closer analysis of the "Status Quo" and "Hollow Formality" stan-
dards reveals that, although courts have outwardly chosen one rather
than the other, both are premised on the same theoretical grounds-sup-
porting protection of the arbitration process. The two standards do not
conflict on the issue of whether to enforce an express promise to maintain
the status quo pending arbitral resolution of arbitral disputes. Grey-
hound 11, in its "Status Quo" approach, explicitly says that courts should
honor such an agreement,79 and nothing in the Lever Brothers line of
"Hollow Formality" cases suggests that a court should ignore the par-
ties' express agreement. In one case following Lever Brothers, the Third
Circuit found no such express promise and held that Greyhound 11 "ulti-
mately depended on the fact that the party seeking equitable relief could
be restored to the status quo ante by arbitration, and therefore risked no
irreparable injury.""
The "Status Quo" approach recognizes the paramount importance of
protecting the arbitration process, as the Ninth Circuit noted even as it
was formulating the standard."1 As noted above, 2 the Status Quo ap-
proach is premised on Gateway Coal's holding that a promise to arbitrate
may imply a promise by the union not to strike, but does not imply a
promise by the employer to maintain the status quo pending arbitra-
tion. 3 The Greyhound II court found that "[t]he source of this differ-
ence is that a strike pending arbitration generally will frustrate and
interfere with the arbitral process while the employer's altering the status
quo generally will not." 4 The court further found that, given the spe-
cific facts at hand, the arbitration would be unaffected by altering the
employees' work schedules since the situation could be "'restored sub-
stantially to the status quo ante' " through reinstitution of the original
work schedules. Thus, under Greyhound IMs "Status Quo" approach
the court will imply a status quo promise only when arbitration is frus-
trated; that is, when it is, in essence, rendered a hollow formality.
The Lever Brothers court noticed this symmetry in formulating the
79. See Greyhound 1I, 550 F.2d 1237, 1238 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 837
(1977).
80. United Steelworkers v. Fort Pitt Steel Casting, 598 F.2d 1273, 1280 n. 19 (3d Cir.
1979) (emphasis in original).
One danger, beyond the scope of this Note, of having such an express promise to main-
tain the status quo pending arbitration would be that the court would have to decide if
the status quo had been disturbed. Attempting to find a "clear violation" of such a broad
status quo promise might well involve "usurping the function of the arbitrator" forbidden
by Boys Mkts, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U.S. 235 (1970). See Niagara Hooker
Employees Union v. Occidental Chem. Corp., 935 F.2d 1370, 1377 (2d Cir. 1991).
81. See Greyhound I, 550 F.2d at 1239.
82. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
83. See Greyhound II, 550 F.2d 1237, 1238 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 837
(1977).
84. Id. at 1238-39.
85. Id. at 1239. (emphasis in original).
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"Hollow Formality" standard. It found that "[t]he reasonableness of our
holding is consonant with the Ninth Circuit decision in Greyhound II
wherein that court also recognized that ... the situation can be restored
substantially to the status quo ante."86 The court noted that an arbitra-
tor could restore the work schedules that were changed in Greyhound II,
but that the relocated plant in Lever Brothers was unlikely to be re-
turned.87 Other courts continue to support the Lever Brothers symmetry
argument. As the Tenth Circuit recently stated, "[the "Hollow Formal-
ity" standard] is ultimately consistent with the Ninth Circuit's ["Status
Quo"] approach because 'once it is conceded that a duty to preserve the
status quo pending arbitration may be implied,' the dispositive question
. . . becomes whether the action will frustrate the arbitral process. ' ' a
Moreover, the "Hollow Formality" approach "more accurately embod-
ies the rationale underlying the Boys Markets exception... [and is] more
straightforward." 89 Similarly, the Second Circuit has also noted the
symmetry between the standards and found that focusing on the effect on
the arbitral process is important because implying a status quo promise
whenever there is an arbitration clause would "permit unions to embroil
the judiciary in day-to-day disputes. .. [and impair management's] ...
ability to run the business."'
Thus, the relevant question for courts today in deciding these cases is
whether the implementation of a drug-testing program pending arbitra-
tion would render the arbitration process a hollow formality. This in-
quiry subsumes the considerations of the "Status Quo" approach as
well. 9' The argument is not over what standard to use, but whether drug
testing causes the irreparable injury that renders arbitration a hollow
formality.
III. DOES DRUG TESTING RENDER THE ARBITRATION PROCESS A
HOLLOW FORMALITY?
In cases where unions seek to enjoin managements' unilateral imple-
mentation of drug-testing programs, there are conflicting opinions on
whether drug testing causes such irreparable injury as to render arbitra-
tion a hollow formality. The Supreme Court has recognized the privacy
rights of public employees subject to drug testing, and has allowed test-
86. Lever Bros. Co. v. International Chem. Workers Union, Local 217, 554 F.2d 115,
122 (4th Cir. 1976) (emphasis in original) (quoting Greyhound II, 550 F.2d at 1239).
87. See idl
88. Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int'l Union, Local 2-286 v. Amoco Oil, 885 F.2d
697, 702 (10th Cir. 1989) (quoting Local Lodge No. 1266, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists &
Aerospace Workers v. Panoramic Corp., 668 F.2d 276, 282 (7th Cir. 1981)).
89. Id
90. Niagara Hooker Employees Union v. Occidental Chem. Corp., 935 F.2d 1370,
1377 (2d Cir. 1991).
91. See Oil, Chemical, 885 F.2d at 704 (overlap with "Hollow Formality" standard
"elevates the assessment of irreparable injury into the central inquiry in status quo in-junction cases").
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ing under the Constitution only where the government has a compelling
interest.9 2 The various courts agree that the privacy rights of the union
employees are implicated, but disagree as to the import and degree of this
violation, both as a matter of law and fact. Because private employers
are not state actors, they are not constitutionally bound by the privacy
rights of their employees. 3 They are, however, bound by their contracts,
and thus the dispositive question is whether the arbitrator will be able to
give the union the benefit of its bargain should the union prevail on the
merits. Part A of this section discusses those approaches that have found
no irreparable injury and that would deny injunctions pending arbitra-
tion of drug-testing disputes. This Note asserts that these approaches are
misguided because they underestimate the stigma associated with a posi-
tive test result and the privacy violation implicit in drug testing. Part B
of this section discusses approaches that correctly emphasize the poten-
tial for irreparable injury in management's interim drug-testing policies
and that would grant the injunctions pending arbitration because of the
risk of a false positive test result and the invasion of privacy.
A. Faith in Arbitral Remedies: the Theory that the Magnitude of the
Privacy Invasion is not Sufficient to Render Arbitration a
Hollow Formality
In general, the argument against enjoining management-initiated drug
testing pending arbitration rejects the notion that the privacy invasion
occasioned by drug testing is sufficient to amount to irreparable injury
for injunction purposes. The recent case of Niagara Hooker Employees
Union v. Occidental Chemical Corp.9 4 is the seminal case representing
this view. 95
The facts of Niagara Hooker are similar to those of most drug-testing
cases brought under Boys Markets96 with the exception that management
92. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 620 (1989); Na-
tional Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665 (1989).
93. See Note, supra note 1, at 25; see also Note, Employee Drug Testing-Issues Fac-
ing Private Sector Employers, 65 N.C.L. Rev. 832, 836 (1987) (absent employment con-
tract or union contract, private sector employers' freedom to test employees is "mostly
unfettered"). Cf Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349 (1974) (noted
separation in fourteenth amendment between discrimination by the state, which is subject
to scrutiny under the amendment, and private conduct against which the amendment
offers no protection no matter how invidious the conduct).
94. 935 F.2d 1370 (2d Cir. 1991).
95. See id. at 1379; see also Local Union No. 733 of the Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v.
Ingalls Shipbuilding Div., Litton Sys., 906 F.2d 149, 153 (5th Cir. 1990) (denied injunc-
tive relief because privacy invasion only minimal); Utility Workers Local No. 246 v.
Southern Cal. Edison Co., 852 F.2d 1083, 1088 (9th Cir. 1988) (same), cert. denied, 489
U.S. 1078 (1989).
96. Namely, the issue for the arbitrator will turn on the interpretation of the manage-
ment's rights clause, which management contends justifies unilateral implementation of a
drug-testing program. See generally Note, supra note 1, at 13-18 (discussing conflict over
whether management's rights clause provides for unilateral drug testing). One such
clause gave management the right, inter alia, "'to hire and assign employees, apply disci-
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in Niagara Hooker wanted to expand its testing for cause program to
include random testing.97 However, the Niagara Hooker court held that
"[w]e do not believe that the arbitrator is so unable to grant effective
relief as to render the arbitral process a 'hollow formality,' if drug testing
proceeds pending arbitration."9'
The Niagara Hooker court based its conclusion mainly on the theory
that the arbitrator could grant effective relief to an employee who is disci-
plined as a result of a false positive test result.99 Reinstatement and
backpay under this theory can address the interim humiliation and harm
to reputation associated with such disciplinary action because such harm
is "no different than (sic) that sustained by an employee who has been
discharged in violation of any provision of a collective bargaining
contract.'"1oo
The notion that the stigma of being fired for drug use is no different
than being fired for some other reason seems debatable, however, in light
of President Bush's emphasis on our nation's "war on drugs."' t Fur-
thermore, the comparison of a failed drug test to other possible stigma-
tizing reasons for discharge-breaking work rules, embezzlement, or
inompetenelo°2-raises an entirely separate issue. The argument over
those charges is whether the employee violated legitimate collectively
bargained rule provisions. The underlying argument in drug-testing
cases, however, is whether the employer lacked the power to implement
the drug-testing program that the employee violated.
The anti-injunction theory also rejects the argument that the privacy
invasion inherent in the compelled production of urine alone justifies the
injunction. 03 The Niagara Hooker court, for example, argued that the
procedures used in management's proposed drug tests would be identical
to those used under the existing cause-testing program and that therefore
they would not constitute a "grievous invasion of privacy."" This is
misguided, however, because an employee would be subject to the ex-
isting procedures only if the employer had cause to test him. The union
may justifiably seek additional confidentiality provisions or other changes
pline, demote or discharge employees for cause, and determine the size of the working
force.'" Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int'l Union, Local 2-286 v. Amoco Oil Co., 885
F.2d 697, 699 n.2 (10th Cir. 1989) (quoting Article 14 of the collective bargaining agree-
ment). A union will typically argue that drug testing is a condition of employment,
which, like wages and benefits, is subject to collective bargaining. See Note, supra note 1,
at 18 n.76.
97. See Niagara Hooker, 935 F.2d at 1373.
98. Id. at 1379.
99. See id.
100. Id.
101. See Text of President's Speech on National Drug Control Strategy, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 6, 1989, at B6, col. S.
102. See Niagara Hooker Employees Union v. Occidental Chem. Corp., 935 F.2d





in the random testing program if drug testing is found to be subject to
collective bargaining. But even if the union prevails in arbitration, those
employees who were randomly tested without cause will have had their
privacy irreparably invaded. 105 Therefore, the Niagara Hooker court's
insistence that "the likelihood of invasion of privacy of the employees is
[not] so great as to render the arbitral process 'meaningless' ,106 is dubi-
ous at best.
Because of the anti-injunction theory adopted by the Second Circuit,
unions have traditionally been unsuccessful in enjoining management in
that forum. 107 Yet practical factors certainly shade courts' decisions as
well. Collateral facts in Niagara Hooker, for instance, suggest that the
court thought the addition of random testing would not be overly bur-
densome on the union and therefore the court was less sympathetic to-
wards it. In addition, an extensive cause-testing program existed at
Occidental, federal regulations required random testing for some work-
ers, and there was a certain risk that drug use might be particularly dan-
gerous at a chemical company.108 However, these factors are not
germane to the issue of what rights management has under the collective
bargaining agreement."° Indeed, fourteen days before the Second Cir-
cuit's decision, the arbitrator ruled in favor of the union.110 That deci-
sion obviously ended the testing, but the union has not sought certiorari,
presumably because it would accomplish nothing for its members. The
arbitrator's award merely sustained the union's grievance and ended the
testing; nothing could be done for the employees whose privacy had been
invaded.
The Fifth Circuit had also been hesitant to find irreparable injury in
the earlier case of Local Union No. 733 of the International Brotherhood
of Electrical Workers v. Ingalls Shipbuilding Division, Litton Systems,III
where it declined to enjoin management's inaugural drug-testing pro-
gram. '1 2 In fact, the Niagara Hooker court's analogy between a false
result on a drug test and a false accusation of embezzlement, theft, or
incompetence came directly from Ingalls.13 As discussed below, this
analysis is misleading where the drug-testing program itself may be inva-
lid.' 4 Therefore, while an inaccurate test result may be a "speculative
possibility of irreparable harm" and thus "not of a magnitude sufficient
105. See infra notes 125-50 and accompanying text.
106. Niagara Hooker, 935 F.2d at 1379.
107. See, eg., American Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO v. United States Postal
Serv., 766 F.2d 715, 723 (2d Cir. 1985) (injunction against management denied); Hoh v.
Pepsico, Inc., 491 F.2d 556, 562 (2d Cir. 1974) (same).
108. See Niagara Hooker, 935 F.2d at 1372-73.
109. See infra note 140 and accompanying text.
110. See Occidental Chem. Corp. v. Niagara Hooker Employees Union (FMCS Case
No. 90-24844), at 14 (1991) (Dybeck, Arb.).
111. 906 F.2d 149 (5th Cir. 1990).
112. See id. at 153.
113. See id.
114. See infra notes 125-50 and accompanying text.
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enough to conclude that traditional arbitral awards would be rendered
meaningless,"'1 15 the test itself will irreparably invade the employee's pri-
vacy.1 6 A finding that the invasion is wrongful, however, is meaningless
if the arbitrator cannot remedy the wrong. The Ingalls court did not go
through this analysis, however, as it merely applied its prior decision in
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Southwest Airlines Co. "7 In
that case, concerning the Railway Labor Act, the Fifth Circuit found
that drug testing was a "minor dispute" and that the threat of irreparable
harm was insufficient to support an injunction under its "extremely nar-
row" grounds for granting such an injunction."s
Finally, an approach that is reluctant to recognize the irreparable in-
jury inherent in drug testing would also tend to deny an injunction under
the similar "Status Quo" standard described above." 9 The Ninth Cir-
cuit's consideration of the issue in Utility Workers, Local No. 216 v.
Southern California Edison Co.,' 20 although extremely brief and con-
clusory, represents such an application. As noted above,' 2' a promise to
maintain the status quo-the prerequisite, under this standard, to en-
joining management's drug-testing program pending arbitration-will be
implied only where the arbitral process is threatened. The Utility Work-
ers court correctly quoted Greyhound 11's rationale for this: "an em-
ployer's altering [of] the status quo generally will not interfere with the
arbitral process."'I While this is undoubtedly true, the court then made
quite a leap in logic to conclude that, "[h]ence, arbitration of the dispute
will be unaffected by the implementation of the drug-testing program,
and there therefore is no need for the issuance of an injunction in aid of
arbitration."' 23 The court similarly stated, without any explanation, that
"'the situation can be restored substantially to the status quo ante.' "124
Thus, because it presumed from the beginning that drug testing posed no
threat of irreparable harm, the Utility Workers court could easily con-
clude that the arbitration process was not harmed, that no promise to
maintain the status quo should be implied, and that therefore the injunc-
tion should be denied. Clearly, however, drug-testing cases are examples
115. Local Union No. 733 of the Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Ingalls Shipbuilding
Div., Litton Sys., 906 F.2d 149, 153 (5th Cir. 1990).
116. See infra notes 125-50 and accompanying text. Furthermore, even if the positive
test result was accurate and the employee was disciplined, the union's arbitration victory
would indeed be "hollow." The employee's records could be re-adjusted but the stigma
surrounding him or her would remain on the minds of co-workers and supervisors. If
management did not have the right to unilaterally implement its drug-testing program,
then this irreparable injury seems unjustified regardless of our opposition to drug use.
117. 875 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1043 (1990).
118. Id at 1136.
119. See supra notes 55-66 and accompanying text.
120. 852 F.2d 1083 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1078 (1989).
121. See supra notes 79-91 and accompanying text.
122. Utility Workers, 852 F.2d at 1088 (citing Greyhound II, 550 F.2d 1237, 1238 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 837 (1977)) (emphasis added).
123. Id (citation omitted).
124. Id. (quoting Greyhound II, 550 F.2d at 1239).
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of those rare instances where arbitration will be affected if the injunction
is not given; the privacy invasions implicit in drug testing are irreparable
and the status quo ante cannot be restored.
B. Truly Irreparable Injury: the Theory that the Privacy Invasion
Does Render Arbitration a Hollow Formality
Ultimately, the argument that unilaterally imposed drug testing ren-
ders pending arbitration a hollow formality must hinge on the judgment
that unjustified drug testing does indeed cause irreparable harm. Oil,
Chemical & Atomic Workers International Union, Local 2-286 v. Amoco
Oil Co. 125 is the seminal case advancing this theory, and it must therefore
be analyzed in detail to flesh out this position's practical application.
In Oil, Chemical, the Tenth Circuit faced a typical Boys Markets drug-
testing case. 126 Amoco's management had decided to begin testing its
unionized employees, and, after only preliminary discussion with the
union, unilaterally implemented its own version of the drug-testing pro-
gram.127 The ensuing dispute over whether management could unilater-
ally implement such a program was clearly arbitrable, as it involved
interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement's management's
rights clause. 128
The Tenth Circuit fully adopted the "Hollow Formality" standard to
determine whether to grant the injunction. 129 The court found that
under Boys Markets, the "ordinary principles of equity" must support
the issuance of the injunction. 3' The court also noted that deciding the
issue raised by one of these principles-irreparable harm-was no differ-
ent than deciding whether arbitration would be a hollow formality; thus
the court decided them together.13 1
The court first considered the likelihood of success on the merits, and
found that the union need only show " 'that the position [it] will espouse
in arbitration is sufficiently sound to prevent the arbitration from being a
futile endeavor.' ",132 This was a fairly low standard that most unions
125. 885 F.2d 697 (10th Cir. 1989).
126. See supra note 93.
127. See Oil, Chemical, 885 F.2d at 699.
128. See id.; Note, supra note 1, at 19-20.
129. See Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int'l Union, Local 2-286 v. Amoco Oil, 885 F.2d
697, 702 (10th Cir. 1989).
130. Id. at 703.
131. See id. at 704; accord Aluminum Workers Int'l Union, Local Union No. 215 v.
Consolidated Aluminum Corp., 696 F.2d 437, 443 (6th Cir. 1982) (irreparable harm and
hollow formality analyses are virtually identical); Local Lodge No. 1266, Int'l Ass'n of
Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Panoramic Corp., 668 F.2d 276, 286 (7th Cir. 1981)
(same); Retail, Wholesale & Dep't Store Union Local 1034 v. Doxsee Food Corp., 650 F.
Supp. 861, 865 (D. Del. 1986) (same).
132. Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int'l Union, Local 2-286 v. Amoco Oil Co., 885
F.2d 697, 704 (10th Cir. 1989) (quoting Greyhound 1, 529 F.2d 1073, 1078 (9th Cir.
1976)).
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could easily satisfy in similar ases.133 Even if the court were to look
more closely at the merits, however, as some commentators have sug-
gested,134 the position taken in this Note would be unaffected. 3 5
The court also considered whether the balance of hardships favored
issuance of the injunction. Since the court accepted the union's position
that the testing would do irreparable harm and that management would
not be adversely affected, the balance was tipped in the union's favor. 1
3 6
Thus, the Oil, Chemical holding suggests that whenever a court accepts a
union's initial claim of irreparable injury, management can avoid the in-
junction only if it can show strong evidence of a drug abuse problem in
the workplace that could cause serious damage before an arbitrator can
rule.137 Clearly, management will have a more difficult time proving this
potential serious damage in cases where management wants to shift from
cause-testing to random testing. Yet the union would still have a valid
claim even if employees are already tested for cause, given the Supreme
Court's acknowledgement of the difference between testing for cause and
random testing.
138
Thus, the dispositive equitable inquiry will be the union's claim of ir-
reparable injury, which is analagous to the overall "Hollow Formality"
133. See iL
134. See Cantor, supra note 30, at 279-82.
135. Professor Cantor supported his theory, in part, because enjoining employers inter-
feres with their legitimate right to make business decisions. See id at 279-80. The Sec-
ond Circuit has also acknowledged that injunctions may impair managment's ability to
run its business. See Niagara Hooker Employees Union v. Occidental Chem. Corp., 935
F.2d 1370, 1377 (2d Cir. 1991). That concern is clearly less warranted in drug-testing
cases, where management's decisions on how to use its resources are unaffected. Further-
more, the National Labor Relations Board has found that under the National Labor
Relations Act, management's unilateral implementation of a drug-testing program was a
mandatory subject of collective bargaining and not covered by the broad management's
rights clause. See Johnson-Bateman Co., 295 N.L.R.B. No. 26, 131 L.R.R.M. 1393, 1399
(June 15, 1989). But cf International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Southwest Airlines Co., 875
F.2d 1129, 1135 (5th Cir. 1989), cerL denied, 493 U.S. 1043 (1990) (court held that drug
testing was a minor dispute under the Railway Labor Act, and thus, the broad manage-
ment's rights clause "arguably justified" unilateral implementation of the drug-testing
program even though the program was a subject of mandatory collective bargaining).
136. Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int'l Union, Local 2-286 v. Amoco Oil Co., 885
F.2d 697, 709 (10th Cir. 1989).
137. None of the Boys Markets drug-testing cases have mentioned this argument, since
the courts denying the injunction pending arbitration have instead found no irreparable
injury. See, e.g., Niagara Hooker Employees Union v. Occidental Chem. Corp., 935 F.2d
1370, 1379 (2d Cir. 1991) ("We do not believe that the arbitrator is so unable to grant
effective relief as to render the arbitral process a 'hollow formality,' if drug testing pro-
ceeds pending arbitration."); Local Union No. 733 of the Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v.
Ingalls Shipbuilding Div., Litton Sys., 906 F.2d 149, 152 (5th Cir. 1990) ("implementa-
tion of the drug testing program prior to the completion of arbitration has not frustrated
the arbitration process or rendered it meaningless").
138. See Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 491 U.S. 299,
318 (1989). The Court stated that "we do not doubt that there is a difference between
Conrail's past regime of... [cause-testing] and Conrail's present policy of including drug
tests in all routine physical examinations." Id.
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standard. 39 As is common, the union in Oil, Chemical was more con-
cerned with random testing and detection levels than with cause testing,
which it conceded was within the management's rights clause."
The crux of the union's successful argument in Oil, Chemical was that
the "potential intrusion into the employees' private lives threatens to
cause them stigmatization, humiliation, and damage to reputation" if us-
ing management's drug-detection levels would result in a wrongful deter-
mination of impairment.14 1 The union maintained that such personal
injuries could not be "redressed by an arbitral award."' 42 The union
could not have based a successful irreparable injury claim on wrongful
termination or suspension, because reinstatement and back pay are ade-
quate remedies for such violations. 143
Implicit in any union's argument is the notion of the invasion of pri-
vacy resulting from being tested at all without the union having agreed to
the applicable procedures. As noted above, the Supreme Court has rec-
ognized the privacy rights of workers subject to drug testing and has
found testing constitutional only when the government had a compelling
interest.1" Although these standards do not apply to private employers,
it is clear that the Court has considered these privacy invasions serious
and has set a very high standard for the government to meet. 45
139. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
140. See Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers Int'l Union, Local 2-286 v. Amoco Oil Co.,
885 F.2d 697, 705 (10th Cir. 1989). Indeed, unions are usually more interested in secur-
ing their rights to negotiate the terms of drug-testing programs than in trying to ban
testing altogether. See generally Note, supra note 1 (discussing employee drug testing
under collective bargaining agreements).
141. Oil, Chemical, 885 F.2d at 705; see also supra notes 98-102 and accompanying
text (arguing that the Niagara Hooker court incorrectly rejected similar claims).
142. Oil, Chemical, 885 F.2d at 705; see also supra notes 98-102 and accompanying
text (arguing that the Niagara Hooker court incorrectly rejected similar claims).
143. See Oil, Chemical, 885 F.2d at 705 (citing Local Lodge No. 1266, Int'l Ass'n of
Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Panoramic Corp., 668 F.2d 276, 286 (7th Cir.
1981)).
144. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
145. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989)
There are few activities in our society more personal or private than the passing
of urine. Most people describe it by euphemisms if they talk about it at all. It is
a function traditionally performed without public observation; indeed, its per-
formance in public is generally prohibited by law as well as social custom.
Id. at 617 (quoting National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 175
(5th Cir. 1987); see also National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656,
665 (1989) (in case decided on the same day as Skinner, Court found that ensuring the
fitness, integrity and judgment of front-line drug interdiction personnel, who carried guns
or handled classified materials, was essential to national security and therefore justified
the drug testing of certain Customs officials); Fried, Privacy, 77 Yale L.J. 475, 487 (1968)
(excretory function shielded by absolute privacy and to the extent this privacy is violated
it "detract[s] from one's dignity and self esteem").
A further privacy interest implicated by drug testing is one's "reasonable and legiti-
mate expectation of privacy in such personal information contained in his body fluids"
that may be discovered upon analysis. McDonell v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp. 1122, 1127
(S.D. Iowa 1985); see also Miller, Mandatory Urinalysis Testing and the Privacy Rights of
Subject Employees: Toward a General Rule of Legality Under the Fourth Amendment, 48
1052 [Vol. 60
DRUG TESTING AND ARBITRATION
Therefore, if an arbitrator decides that the collective bargaining agree-
ment does not authorize drug testing, any completed testing has violated
the privacy rights of those employees without justification. The union
will have been denied the opportunity to protect the rights of its mem-
bers, and the union employees will have suffered irreparable injury. No
amount of money can fully address the personal injury occasioned when
privacy rights are invaded.1" Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that the
Constitution requires a compelling justification before the Government
can violate privacy rights, but a private employer can violate such rights
by a unilateral interpretation of a silent collective bargaining agreement.
It would be even more suprising for the employer to have this much
discretion given that labor is such a heavily regulated field on the federal
level.147 Unionized employees in the private sector deserve to be free
from such serious privacy invasions until an arbitrator has rendered a
decision.
The Oil, Chemical court concluded that "[i]n light of the invasion of
privacy threatened by Amoco's testing program, and the potential for
stigmatization and humiliation of its employees, we do not believe that
an arbitral award of reinstatement and back-pay could make affected em-
ployees whole."14 The court therefore held that the drug-testing pro-
gram could cause "irreparable injuries that threaten the integrity of the
arbitral process and adequately support the issuance of a status quo in-
junction." '49 As the Oil, Chemical court reasoned, and as many district
courts have since agreed, the invasion of privacy and the possibility of
humiliation and damage to reputation associated with drug testing con-
U. Pitt. L. Rev. 201, 206-07 (1986) ("if allowed free reign over an employee's urine speci-
men, the employer can learn physiological secrets... which go far beyond the existence
of drugs. A urine specimen can... reveal whether an employee is pregnant, is using licit
medications, or is being treated for a heart condition, manic-depression, epilepsy, diabetes
or schizophrenia.").
146. The OiL Chemical court was persuaded on this point by the Supreme Court's
finding of irreparable injury to support a status quo injunction where management's ac-
tions involved" 'the discharge of employees from positions long held and the dislocation
of others from their homes.'" Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int'l Union, Local 2-286 v.
Amoco Oil Co., 885 F.2d 697, 708 (10th Cir. 1989) (quoting Brotherhood of Locomotive
Eng'rs v. Missouri-Kan.-Tex. R.R., 363 U.S. 528, 534 (1960)) (emphasis omitted). The
OiL Chemical court thought that this decision supported a "wide focus in assessing the
nature of the threatened injury," since reinstatement and backpay are usually considered
adequate remedies for wrongful discharge. Id. at 709. Thus, the court could analogize
the dislocation in Missouri-Kan.-Tex R.R. with the privacy violation at issue, finding that
it would be "impossible [for the arbitrator] to make [the employees] whole in any realistic
sense." Ido at 708 (quoting Missouri-Kan.-Tex RK., 363 U.S. at 534) (emphasis
omitted).
147. See, e.g., Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act §§ 1-503, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 141-88 (1988) (regulating collective bargaining practices); Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29
U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1988) (governing the issuance of restraining orders and injunctions by
the courts in labor disputes).




stitute irreparable injury.1 50
CONCLUSION
Drug testing of employees is an invasion of their privacy which courts
cannot take lightly. Just as the Government needs a compelling interest
to drug test its employees, collective bargaining ensures that unionized
private sector workers are not indiscriminately tested. If an arbitrator
ultimately finds a drug-testing program to be unjustified, the harm done
150. See International Bhd. of Elec. Workers Sys. Council 4-9 v. Metropolitan Edison
Co., No. 86-4426, 1986 WL 376 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 14, 1986); see also International Bhd. of
Elec. Workers Sys. Council U-4 v. Florida Power & Light, 678 F. Supp. 257, 258 (S.D.
Fla. 1987) (injunction needed against drug testing program "to protect the integrity of
the arbitration process"); Stove, Furnace & Allied Appliance Workers' Int'l Union, Local
185 v. Weyerhaeuser Paper Co., 650 F. Supp. 431, 433 (S.D. Ill. 1986) (potential invasion
of privacy and "black mark" on employee's record are injuries that cannot be redressed
by court at law or an arbitrator and they constitute irreparable injury). Cf International
Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 1900 v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 634 F. Supp. 642, 645
(D.D.C. 1986) (court declined to enjoin management's drug testing program but did so
only because management agreed not to change existing policy until after arbitration).
But see Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers, Local 6-10 v. Amoco Oil Co., 653 F. Supp. 300,
303 (D.N.D. 1986) (irreparable injury would not result from implementation of new drug
testing policy); Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int'l Union, Local 2-124 v. Amoco Oil
Co., 651 F. Supp. 1, 5 (D. Wyo. 1986) (same).
The other circuits have considered cases where unions involved in different disputes
have sought Boys Markets injunctions, but many if not all of these cases have been rather
clear-cut and difficult to compare to the drug-testing cases. The question of irreparable
injury is more complex in these latter cases.
The first group of cases involved management decisions to alter the general policies of
the workplace. The courts have unanimously declined to enjoin these decisions pending
arbitration. See Independent Oil & Chem. Workers v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 864
F.2d 927, 931 (1st Cir. 1988) (work schedules and dress requirements); Aluminum Work-
ers Int'l Union, Local No. 215 v. Consolidated Aluminum Corp., 696 F.2d 437, 443 (6th
Cir. 1982) (job classification); Columbia Local, Am. Postal Workers Union v. Bolger,
621 F.2d 615, 618 (4th Cir. 1980) (shift schedules); see also Greyhound I1, 550 F.2d 1237,
1239 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 837 (1977) (work schedules). If the union prevailed
at arbitration, it is clear that the harm caused could be remedied through reinstatement of
the old policies.
The second group of cases involved instances where management sought to relocate its
factory or sell its assets. In these cases, the courts have issued injunctions pending arbi-
tration. See Lever Bros. Co. v. International Chem. Workers Union, Local 217, 554 F.2d
115 (4th Cir. 1976) (relocation); Nursing Home & Hosp. Union No. 434 v. Sky Vue
Terrace, Inc., 759 F.2d 1094, 1095 (3d Cir. 1985) (sale of business assets); Local Lodge
No. 1266, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Panoramic Corp., 668 F.2d
276, 277 (7th Cir. 1981) (sale of corporate assets); Drivers, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen &
Helpers Teamsters Local Union No. 71 v. Akers Motor Lines, Inc., 582 F.2d 1336, 1338
(4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 929 (1979) (liquidation of business). Because arbi-
trators do not normally have the power to force an employer to stay in business, the only
method of enforcing the contractual provisions breached by such a move is the status
quo injunction.
In one case, a court enjoined management's attempt to terminate the hospital and in-
surance benefits enjoyed by the union members, because the threat of death would clearly
be irreparable. See United Steelworkers v. Fort Pitt Steel Casting, Div. of Conval.-Penn,
598 F.2d 1273, 1280 (3d Cir. 1979). Overall, these cases are distinguishable to such an
extent that their relevance to drug-testing cases is limited.
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to the tested employees is irreparable and indeed renders the entire arbi-
tration process a hollow formality. Therefore, although courts and em-
ployers routinely articulate the valid management concerns for
workplace safety and efficiency, the emphasis on individual liberty in the
American legal system requires that a union be able to obtain an injunc-
tion pending arbitration of the validity of a new drug-testing program.

